## Affirmative DA Unity Answers

### No NATO Unity / Cohesion

#### Cohesion fraying now --- Turkey and Hungary blocking NATO priorities

Bloomberg Editors 22 [June 20, 2022, “Western Unity Is More Essential Than Ever”, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/western-unity-is-more-essential-than-ever/2022/06/10/0c095a50-e8be-11ec-a422-11bbb91db30b_story.html>, acc 6/19/22, NB]

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine has made the West — in this context, NATO and the European Union — more united than it’s been in a long time. Unfortunately, that cohesion is now at risk, as the Russian invasion turns into a grinding war of attrition. To deter Putin from escalating and to keep him from winning, Western leaders must focus on the two weakest links in their alliance: Turkey and Hungary.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the president of Turkey — a member of NATO but not the EU — says he will block the accession of Sweden and Finland to the transatlantic alliance unless he’s given a series of unrelated concessions. If he actually follows through, he would not only leave both countries more vulnerable to Russian aggression, but also render NATO weaker than it should be in defending its Baltic members. Gratuitously, Erdogan is also increasing tensions with Greece, another NATO ally.

Then there’s Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. For weeks, he’s been holding up a sanctions package that would embargo Russian oil. EU leaders last week thought they had finally reached a compromise: Only Russian oil delivered by ship would be banned, whereas the sort arriving via pipelines would not. That would give landlocked Hungary, as well as the Czech Republic and Slovakia, more time to adjust their energy infrastructure.

In a shocking breach of decorum, Orban then reneged on even that compromise. Bizarrely, he also insisted on keeping the Russian Orthodox Church’s Patriarch Kirill — a staunch backer of Putin and the war — off the new sanctions list. The EU gave in to this demand, too, to get the package passed.

The whole ordeal was an embarrassment, and a rare cause for Putin to be optimistic. In every way he can, Orban is signaling that he’s not fully behind the West’s joint effort to support Ukraine and undermine Russia — in effect, that he’s not a reliable ally.

So what can be done? A basic design flaw shared by both the EU and NATO is that neither has a mechanism to eject errant members. That means both will need to get creative in reining in rogue leaders.

In Erdogan’s case, acceding to blackmail shouldn’t be an option. The US should announce that future arms sales to Turkey will be halted until it comes around on the new accessions. NATO should threaten to suspend Turkish involvement in military planning and exercises. If the situation escalates, revisiting the alliance’s rules to allow for expulsions should be on the table.

As for Orban, the EU will need to adopt a similarly hard line. In 2018, the bloc triggered its treaty’s Article 7 against Hungary in a censure of its subversion of democratic institutions, launching a process that could in theory strip Budapest of its voting rights in Brussels. In practice, the measure has been toothless, because it requires unanimous support. Poland, whose populist government is also the target of an Article 7 proceeding, always had Hungary’s back.

These days, however, Poland is among the member states that are most hawkishly anti-Putin. And Warsaw is horrified by Orban’s obstructionism. Belatedly, the Poles have come to understand that a strong EU is in their national interest, not against it. They should therefore persuade Orban to join the effort to weaken Putin’s war machine and strengthen Ukraine. If he doesn’t, the other 26 EU countries — including Poland — should strip Hungary of its votes.

Holding together the Western alliance has never been easy. Amid a worsening war on its doorstep, it has rarely seemed more necessary. The time for populist political games is over.

#### NATO still facing several obstacles that undermine cohesion --- disagreements over strategic concept and political and military weaknesses

Lucas, 22 --- nonresident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (JUNE 7, 2022, 5:31 AM, Edward, “NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date; With the bloc’s unity over Ukraine showing cracks, NATO needs an overhaul,” <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/nato-ukraine-russia-war-alliance-reform-geopolitics-military/>, JMP)

Yet look a little more closely, and the picture is far less rosy. Notwithstanding its apparent unity of purpose since the start of Russia’s war, NATO looks out of shape and out of date. In the run-up to their summit, the allies have been furiously haggling over the language in their new strategic concept, which will frame the alliance’s mission for the coming years and will be unveiled in Madrid. What will it say about Russia? About China? What sacrifices and risks are the member states really willing to accept? Are they willing to pool sovereignty in order to streamline decision-making?

Nothing in recent weeks suggests that these questions will get clear answers. For starters, the 30-strong alliance is unwieldy. In military terms, only a handful of members matter—above all, the United States—but in political terms, even little Luxembourg and Iceland get a voice. Worse, the political divides are huge. Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a semi-authoritarian state that flirts with Russia and fumes at what it considers European meddling over human rights. Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orban is taking a different but downward path, fusing wealth and power into a new system of control at home and undermining U.S. and European attempts to put pressure on Russia and China. Macron’s relentless posturing and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s foot-dragging create constant obstacles and distractions. The two leader’s weaknesses, on glorious display since the start of the war, have already enriched the language: Scholzen is a German neologism for “dither,” while makronic in Polish (and its equivalent in Ukrainian) can be roughly translated as “vacuous grandstanding while doing nothing.”

Macron and Scholz corrode decision-making with their foibles and thus place a big question mark over the alliance’s credibility and cohesion. Any threat or provocation from Russia is unlikely to be clear or conveniently timed. More likely it will be something deliberately ambiguous, such as a Russian drone that “accidentally” strays onto the territory of a front-line state and hits a target. Some countries would favor a tough response. Others would fear escalation and want dialogue. Still others would take the ambiguity as a convenient excuse to do nothing. Would the 30—soon to be 32—national representatives in the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s deliberative body, really make a speedy and tough decision on how to react? More likely, some of them would plead for delay, diplomacy, and compromise. Those actually facing the possibility of attack would be far more hawkish, preferring a sharp military confrontation to even the smallest Russian victory. “Not one inch, not one soul,” a senior military figure from one of the Baltic states, speaking anonymously, told me. “We have seen what they did in Ukraine.”

The political weaknesses are matched by military ones. By far the most important country in the alliance is the United States. The U.S. security guarantee to Europe—with its threat of devastating conventional and, if necessary, nuclear response to any attack—is the cornerstone of the alliance. “All for one and one for all” sounds fine, but nobody in the Kremlin will tremble at the thought of Spanish, Dutch, or Canadian displeasure. Yet the result of this is a colossal dependence on U.S. capabilities, ranging from ammunition and spare parts (of which European countries’ stockpiles are notoriously skinny) to military transports that move forces quickly and efficiently over long distances. Even if Europe’s new defense spending plans materialize, they will not change the fact that only U.S. armed forces can move with the scale and speed necessary to defend territory from a country like Russia.

Conversely, the countries that most need defending—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are the least able to bear the burden themselves. They need advanced weapons, particularly for air and missile defense, that they cannot afford themselves. The thin neck of land along the Polish-Lithuanian border, the so-called Suwalki Gap, is particularly vulnerable to attack from Russia’s militarized Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus, from which Russia attacked Ukraine. Poland and Lithuania both want a big U.S. military presence—either a permanent base or a persistent rotation of forces—to safeguard this strategic chokepoint.

Yet NATO command structures and planning do not fully reflect the imbalance of forces between the United States and Europe. They rely on the fiction that the European allies are more or less equal partners. Even military lightweights need to have important-sounding jobs and installations, making the North Atlantic Council the military version of a parliament dividing out the pork.

The resulting command structure is like a tangled pile of spaghetti. In the Baltic region alone, NATO has several multinational headquarters, one divisional headquarterss split between Latvia and Denmark, another divisional headquarters in Poland, and a corps headquarters at a different location in Poland. Overall responsibility for the defense of Europe is divided between three Joint Forces Command headquarters in Naples, Italy; Brunssum, the Netherlands; and Norfolk, Virginia. But the top U.S. military commander in Europe, Air Force Gen. Tod Wolters, is based at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium. A maritime strategy for the Baltic Sea region has yet to be decided—which is just as well, because NATO has yet to create a naval headquarters for the region. Nor has the alliance drawn up real military plans for the reinforcement and defense of its northeastern members, let alone decided who would actually provide the forces and equipment in order to make them credible. Military mobility is meant to be the responsibility of Joint Support and Enabling Command, headquartered in Ulm, Germany, and originally set up as part of the European Union’s own defense policy.

A further problem is exercises: NATO does not conduct fully realistic, large-scale rehearsals of how it would respond to a Russian attack. One problem is that these are costly and disruptive. Another is that they expose the huge weaknesses of some NATO members, which can cope with a carefully scripted exercise but lack the ability to improvise. A third reason is the fear, in some countries, that practicing war-fighting would be provocative. Also lacking are detailed plans for fighting a war against Russia, covering such issues as reinforcing of front-line states, countering a Russian attack, regaining any temporarily occupied territory, and—most of all—dealing with a nuclear or other escalation. As a result, nobody is quite sure how anything would work in a crisis. Instead, another assumption reigns: that in a crisis, the United States would take over and do the heavy lifting on all fronts—logistics, intelligence, and combat.

To be fair, NATO is working on these problems, and all of them are fixable. But that does not mean that they are anywhere near being fixed. Wishful thinking remains the alliance’s besetting sin.

#### NATO not united on Ukraine

Carpenter 22 – senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute [Ted Galen, MARCH 23, 2022, CATO institute, “Just How United Is NATO (and the World) against Russia?” [https://www.cato.org/commentary/just-how-united-nato-world-against-russia Acc 6/24/22](https://www.cato.org/commentary/just-how-united-nato-world-against-russia%20Acc%206/24/22) ER]

Moscow’s aggression also has triggered a sense of alarm and a more serious attitude in multiple European countries about doing more for NATOs collective defense mission. That shift has been especially evident in Germany, where Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s government approved an emergency fund to boost Berlin’s military budget by 100 billion Euros. The latter move would finally fulfill Germany’s longstanding pledge (along with all other NATO members) to spend at least 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product annually on defense. Berlin had repeatedly procrastinated about carrying out that commitment. A far more militant posture by the Scholz government also was apparent when it stated an intent to ship weapons to Ukraine to bolster that country’s military resistance. Previous German governments would have considered such involvement in a raging war unthinkable. Numerous other NATO members, including the United States, already are pouring weapons into Ukraine.

Nevertheless, it is easy to **overstate the degree of unity** regarding policy toward Russia even among NATO members, much less within the broader international community. Indeed, some **cracks already are beginning to form** in NATO’s solid front. When Poland’s Vice Premier, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, suggested that the Alliance send an armed peacekeeping force to Ukraine to provide humanitarian aid, the reactions were widely divergent. Estonian Defense Minister Kalle Laanet said that a proposed peacekeeping mission was “one of the possibilities” NATO should consider, but several other governments pushed back. We’re “still in too early stages to talk about that,” said Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren, adding that such a deployment would need the backing of the United Nations Security Council—a requirement that made the plan a nonstarter, since as a permanent member of the Council, Russia holds veto power.

**Divisions within NATO** are even **increasingly evident** on the issue of providing weapons to Ukraine. Addressing a massive campaign rally on March 15, Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orban, emphasized that “we must stay out of this war … therefore we will not send any troops or weapons to the battlegrounds.” A few days later, Bulgarian Prime Minister Kiril Petkov stated flatly that his country will not engage in “hostilities” in Ukraine and that no arms will be supplied.

#### While US may support aid to Ukraine, there lack of unity and cohesion globally on strategy

Carpenter 22 – senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute [Ted Galen, MARCH 23, 2022, CATO institute, “Just How United Is NATO (and the World) against Russia?” [https://www.cato.org/commentary/just-how-united-nato-world-against-russia Acc 6/24/22](https://www.cato.org/commentary/just-how-united-nato-world-against-russia%20Acc%206/24/22) ER]

Beyond NATO (and longstanding U.S. allies in East Asia), the absence of support for Washington’s strategy of imposing harsh penalties on Russia is glaringly evident. That problem surfaced almost immediately. On March 2, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and calling for the immediate withdrawal of Russian military forces. 141 countries voted for the resolution, and U.S. officials gloated that only 5 voted against it.

However, a stunning 35 countries decided to abstain, even though a favorable vote to placate the United States and its allies should have been an easy option, since the resolution was purely symbolic, not obligating UN members to take any substantive action. Yet a significant number of countries in Asia, the Greater Middle East, and Sub‐​Saharan Africa, opted to snub Washington. When more than 20 percent of the General Assembly’s membership refuses to embrace a purely feel‐​good measure Washington wants passed, the U.S.-sponsored global coalition looks fragile indeed.

It is especially ominous for U.S. objectives that both China and India have remained firm in their opposition to imposing economic sanctions on Russia—as have numerous other countries outside of Europe and East Asia. Even portions of Latin America have balked at waging an economic war against Russia. Indeed, beyond Washington’s network of traditional allies, the isolation of Russia appears to be significantly exaggerated.

Political scientists frequently note that coalitions tend to be a **mile wide but only an inch deep**. That situation may well apply to NATO unity regarding policy toward Russia. When it comes to the rest of the world, any sense of unity on that issue is not even a half‐​inch deep.

### AT: Consultation Link

#### Consultations have not been effective in strengthening NATO – there is no enforcement or obligation

Lorenz, 20 --- international security expert at the Polish Institute of International Affairs [Wojciech, November, 2020, “Strengthening NATO’s cohesion through consultation”, <https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ICDS_Brief_NATO2030_-Series_1_Wojciech_Lorenz_November-2020_cor.pdf>, accessed 6/23/22, NB]

The strongest norms and most elaborate mechanisms have been developed regarding consultations on collective defence policy. Since this is a primary task of NATO, derived directly from the Washington Treaty, some experts claim that there might be a legal obligation to consult before a NATO member takes a definite action, which could undermine the common defence.4 There is no mechanism to enforce compliance and there are numerous examples of Allies bypassing consultation to take unilateral actions. Nevertheless, most Allies try to respect such a norm as it creates a similar obligation for the US, limiting the risk, for example, of the unexpected or uncoordinated withdrawal of US troops from Europe.

There is another important dimension of consultations concerning actions outside the Euro-Atlantic area—since this is not a ‘treaty area’ there is no apparent legal obligation to consult. Nevertheless, the European Allies expected the US to use consultations to inform them about plans that could affect NATO’s security. The US was also interested in such consultations, expecting that they would facilitate coordination of NATO policies in support of American foreign policy goals, but this rarely turned out to be the case. The 1967 Harmel report was an attempt to strengthen this dimension of consultation and thus NATO’s political cohesion, stating that “the North Atlantic

Treaty Area cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the world. Crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its security either directly or by affecting the global balance.”5

In 1974, NATO made another attempt to strengthen consultations adopting the Ottawa Declaration, which stressed that “the Allies are firmly resolved to keep each other fully informed and to strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations by all means which may be appropriate on matters relating to their common interests as members of the Alliance, bearing in mind that these interests can be affected by events in other areas of the world.”6

Such declarations, however, did not solve the structural problems that discouraged states from consulting to coordinate common responses to crises outside the treaty area. Some states blocked such consultations, believing that the Alliance should not deal with problems beyond its ‘treaty area’ and that discussions could lead to new commitments that would undermine collective defence and deterrence policy. Bigger states also wanted to preserve their privileged bilateral relations with the US, which often resulted in informal consultations in smaller formats. The US did not want to share sensitive information with all Allies without guarantees that this would result in coordinated action in support of US foreign policy goals.

#### NATO consultations have not diffused tensions

Lorenz, 20 --- international security expert at the Polish Institute of International Affairs [Wojciech, November, 2020, “Strengthening NATO’s cohesion through consultation”, <https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ICDS_Brief_NATO2030_-Series_1_Wojciech_Lorenz_November-2020_cor.pdf>, accessed 6/23/22, NB]

In recent years, NATO’s mechanisms of consultation have proved lacking in defusing tensions and discouraging unilateral actions, both in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond it.

During Donald Trump’s presidency, for example, the US withdrew troops from Syria, despite the possible impact on the security of the Allies. This unilateral decision encouraged Turkey to send troops to Syria, which could further complicate the fight with Islamic terrorist groups and increase the risk of confrontation between Turkey and Russia, which has a military presence in Syria. Also, despite NATO’s presence in Afghanistan, the US pursued negotiations with the Taliban without providing NATO with an insight into its plans. And it only resorted to consultations in NATO on its decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty after the criticism from the Allies. Similarly, it first announced the decision to withdraw troops from Germany and only later consulted with Allies about how to limit the impact on NATO. Some of these decisions were publicly criticised by NATO members, most vocally by French president Emmanuel Macron who, before the 2019 NATO leaders meeting, accused the Alliance of being “brain dead” and took the opportunity to promote the idea of European ‘strategic autonomy’.9

### Unity Not Key

#### Unity is not key to helping member states--- disagreements are inevitable and a built-in benefit

Skaluba & Rodhian, 22 --- \*served as principal director for European and NATO policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, AND \*\*associate director in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Transatlantic Security Initiative (January 18, 2022, Christopher Skaluba – also director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and Conor Rodihan, “No consensus? No problem. Why NATO is still effective,” <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/no-consensus-no-problem-why-nato-is-still-effective/>, JMP)

As the crisis over Ukraine intensifies, key stakeholders are looking to Brussels for signs of Western resolve. At the NATO-Russia Council meeting on January 12, the Alliance delivered: In a vivid expression of solidarity, it categorically (and unanimously) rejected Russian demands to forgo future expansion or withdraw forces from member countries.

Yet as the crisis evolves, decisions about how to support Ukraine will become more difficult, and there’s a limit to how unified NATO can be. While the West might agree on introducing tough new economic sanctions and reinforcing the Alliance’s eastern flank, boosting Kyiv’s military capacity—by supporting an insurgency, for instance, or sending anti-tank weapons—will be impossible to achieve by consensus and is much more likely to come from individual members than under NATO auspices.

This shouldn’t be surprising. Consider Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its ongoing support for separatists in Ukraine’s Donbas region: NATO actions in support of Kyiv have been more political than operational, leaving it to individual allies to provide munitions, equipment, and training to Ukrainian forces. And despite a recurrent pledge that Ukraine would one day be welcome to join the Alliance, as well as the sympathy expressed by allies for Ukraine’s plight, there’s been precious little progress on this front.

NATO is primarily concerned about defending its members from Russian aggression—which it is also wary of provoking by supporting the Ukrainian military.

Yet despite its lack of meaningful military support for Ukraine, the crisis has been the animating issue on the Alliance’s agenda since 2014. Russia’s attacks on Ukraine and its support for separatists have driven major NATO initiatives on readiness, defense planning, force posture, intelligence, and technology development, with an eye toward beefing up the Alliance’s northern and eastern flanks and deterring Russia in both the conventional and sub-threshold realms. As an institution established to safeguard Europe, it has successfully geared itself to deter the type of destabilizing Russian belligerence currently on display.

Critics of the alliance (and even some supporters) have interpreted NATO’s unwillingness to militarily support Ukraine—especially during the most significant challenge to the European security order since the Cold War—as an indicator of its declining relevance, timidity, or its divisions. But that overstates the importance of political consensus to NATO’s value and understates its role as an effective and flexible defensive alliance. This is a role with potentially critical benefits for Ukraine.

First, it sets too high a bar for an alliance of thirty members with aligned, but distinct, priorities. Unanimity on every issue is impossible, let alone one as complex as military support to Ukraine. Debate and disagreement, as it should be for any democratic institution, are built-in features of NATO—not bugs. In reality, it’s astounding how often NATO does reach consensus about issues big and small, creating an unrealistic expectation that it always will. The opposite of consensus is not failure. Suggesting otherwise turns any debate that doesn’t end harmoniously into an indictment of NATO, playing straight into Russian propaganda.

Second, a belief that NATO’s value is tied primarily to achieving consensus on every issue misses the more mundane (and important) ways it supports its allies and partners. Its affinity for process—particularly its ability to build a common situational understanding among its members—is an invaluable tool. Habits of consultation and information sharing, buttressed by deep cooperation on operations, intelligence sharing, defense planning, and interoperability, create the foundation upon which any consensus is to be built. Even in the absence of that agreement, the ability to collectively define threats and jointly train to confront them is immensely valuable in its own right.

Third, these habits of cooperation give NATO members the flexibility to act outside of the Alliance’s frameworks. While NATO does much by consensus—such as its missions in the Baltic states—the skills it helps members develop is central to enabling them to form separate coalitions for action. This happened recently with ample success in taking on the Islamic State. Such flexibility should be a point in NATO’s favor, not evidence of its ineptitude.

In the case of military support for Ukraine, policymakers will find more attractive alternatives for dealing with Moscow’s aggression outside of the auspices of the Alliance. Up to and including its recent dialogue with Russia, it has taken a host of consensus actions to support Ukraine—from condemning Kremlin aggression and standing up for Kyiv politically to reaffirming its open-door policy with an expectation that Ukraine will eventually become a member. It might even share intelligence and develop training and advisory programs for the Ukrainian military.

And while it won’t find a consensus to fight, it could provide the foundation for certain allies to support Ukrainian forces in ways consistent with their national priorities outside of NATO. In that case, NATO’s enabling value to its members in complicating Putin’s cost-benefit assessment should be applauded.

Last week’s NATO-Russia Council meeting showcased an Alliance working in lockstep and finding political consensus in responding to preposterous Russian demands. NATO should always strive for this degree of consensus. But if and when this crisis intensifies, and Putin advances further into Ukraine, expectations for NATO assistance will be raised, decisions about how to respond will become more difficult, and consensus will be more elusive.

Despite the rhetoric we might hear in response, this is not evidence of NATO’s ineffectiveness—but rather a reflection of how democratic institutions function. And even absent consensus, NATO can still contribute invaluably to Ukraine’s sovereignty.

### NATO Can’t Solve Russia

#### NATO unprepared for Russia’s modern warfare

* Weaponizing of hunger
* Campaign of disinformation

Lucas, 22 --- nonresident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (JUNE 7, 2022, 5:31 AM, Edward, “NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date; With the bloc’s unity over Ukraine showing cracks, NATO needs an overhaul,” <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/nato-ukraine-russia-war-alliance-reform-geopolitics-military/>, JMP)

Worse, NATO is unprepared for the changing nature of modern warfare. Russia’s old-style assault on Ukraine is all too familiar. But the artillery bombardments and missile strikes that are grinding down Ukraine’s defenses are only part of the Kremlin’s arsenal. Its most effective weapons are nonmilitary: subversion, diplomatic divide-and-rule tactics, economic coercion, corruption, and propaganda. The most burning current example of nonmilitary warfare is Russia’s weaponizing of hunger. By blocking Ukraine’s grain exports, Russia has raised the specter of famine over millions of people, including in volatile and fragile countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Mass starvation is not just a humanitarian catastrophe, but its consequences include political unrest and mass migration, a direct threat to Europe. Yet NATO is ill-equipped to deal with this. It cannot mandate more economical use of grain—for example, by feeding less to livestock and stopping grain’s conversion to fuel. It has no food stockpiles to release to a hungry world. It cannot build new railways to ship Ukrainian grain through other routes. Nor can it insure merchant vessels that might—for a price—be willing to run Russia’s Black Sea blockade. NATO has little in-house expertise in countering Russian disinformation and almost zero influence in African and other countries susceptible to Kremlin narratives blaming the West for the food shortages that are already starting now.

NATO could acquire these capabilities. Or it could regain them: During the Cold War, the alliance had an economic warfare division and ran a program called the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls to prevent the Soviet bloc from acquiring sensitive technologies. But in the strategic timeout that followed the collapse of the Soviet bloc, these agencies and their skill sets shriveled and died.

But as with NATO’s military shortcomings, identifying the problems is not the same as solving them. And given the bloc’s unwieldy structure and issues with key members, it might be wise to lower expectations about NATO returning to Cold War levels of consistent readiness and effectiveness. A more realistic vision for the alliance would be to treat it as a framework for the most capable and threat-aware members to form coalitions of the willing. These groupings already exist: The British-led Joint Expeditionary Force, for example, is a 10-country framework for military cooperation, chiefly aimed at enabling very rapid deployments to the Nordic-Baltic region in the event of a crisis. France has a similar venture, the European Intervention Initiative. The five Nordic states have their own military club, called the Nordic Defence Cooperation, while Poland has close bilateral ties with Lithuania. A similar network of bilateral and multilateral ties would greatly strengthen the alliance’s floundering presence in the Black Sea and other regions, including North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. These groupings would not supplant NATO but improve action and interoperability on top of the alliance’s established structures and mechanisms.

The difficult and underlying question here is the role of the United States. Europe is, in theory, big and rich enough to manage its own defense. But its persistent political weakness prevents that. The paradox is that only U.S. involvement makes NATO credible—yet overdependence on the United States also undermines the alliance’s credibility, while stoking resentment in France and elsewhere. The task for Washington is to encourage European allies to shoulder more of the burden and start thinking strategically again, even as it retains the superpower involvement that gives the alliance its decisive military edge. That is entirely doable. But don’t expect it to happen in Madrid—or anytime soon.

### Russia Won’t Use Nuclear Weapons

#### Nuclear use unlikely by Putin --- would make him a pariah and alienate Russia from the international community

Wormuth, 22 --- Secretary of the Army, US Department of Defense (June 2, 2022, Christine Wormuth, moderated by Vivian Salama who serves as a national security reporter at The Wall Street Journal “NATO allies must not take their unity on Ukraine for granted, says Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth,” <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/nato-allies-must-not-take-their-unity-on-ukraine-for-granted-says-secretary-of-the-army-christine-wormuth/>, JMP)

VIVIAN SALAMA: Before we move on to another subject, just a really blunt question, being that there is concern that President Putin could resort to nuclear weapons at some stage, especially if he gets desperate in this conflict. What is the Army’s role in preventing that kind of a scenario, especially absent direct military involvement in Ukraine?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: You know, I think what we can do—I mean, first of all, I think it’s important to say that, you know, we are undoubtedly looking at that type of contingency and trying to think through what our options—you know, what options would be available to policymakers if that were to happen? The Army, I think what we can most, you know, helpfully do is to try to provide training for how to operate under those kinds of conditions. You know, we have personal protective equipment and things like that. But I think, you know, if Putin were to decide to use some sort of tactical nuclear demonstration, I think, you know, that would erase, in my mind, any possibility that he could be anything other than a pariah leader and a—leader of a pariah state, you know, for decades going forward. So I think that Putin would have to think extremely long and hard about that, since he clearly wants to try to bring Russia back into the international community at some point. I don’t see how he does that if he goes nuclear.

## Affirmative DA NATO Expansion Answers

### Turkey Will Block NATO Expansion to Sweden / Finland

#### Turkey will NOT let Sweden and Finland join NATO --- won’t be persuaded

Turak, 22 -- CNBC correspondent (5/17/22, Natasha ‘The stakes here are now massive’: Turkey is threatening to block NATO membership for Sweden and Finland. <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/17/will-turkey-block-nato-membership-for-sweden-and-finland.html>) //AB

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has doubled down on his opposition to Sweden and Finland joining the NATO alliance, a move that would be historic for the two Nordic countries in the wake of [Russia’s invasion of Ukraine](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/17/russia-ukraine-live-updates.html).

“We will not say ‘yes’ to those [countries] who apply sanctions to Turkey to join security organization NATO,” Erdogan said at a news conference late Monday. He was referring to Sweden’s suspension of weapons sales to Turkey in 2019 over its military activities in Syria.

Sweden’s Foreign Ministry said Monday that it planned to send senior officials joining with officials from Finland to the Turkish capital of Ankara to address Erdogan’s objections. But the Turkish leader essentially said they’d be wasting their time.

“Will they come to persuade us? Excuse us, but they shouldn’t bother,” Erdogan said. He added that the two countries joining would make NATO “a place where representatives of terrorist organizations are concentrated.”

#### Turkey won’t vote for membership until Sweden and Finland address Kurdish activists

Wintour, 22 – Diplomatic Editor of The Guardian [Patrick; 6/14/22; The Guardian; “Turkey threatens year’s delay to Swedish and Finnish entry to Nato”; <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/14/turkey-threatens-years-delay-to-swedish-and-finnish-entry-to-nato>; accessed 6/18/22; DWC]

Turkey has said it is willing to delay Swedish and Finnish membership of Nato for more than a year unless it receives satisfactory assurances that the two Nordic countries are willing to address support for Kurdish groups it regards as terrorist organisations.

Finland’s prime minister said on Tuesday that the two nations’ Nato applications could stall if the issue is not resolved before a vital Nato summit due to start in Madrid on 29 June.

Turkey accuses Sweden and Finland of harbouring alleged members of the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK) and also objects to their decisions in 2019 to ban arms exports to Ankara due to Turkey’s military operations in Syria.

Turkey has gone on a public diplomacy offensive to highlight Swedish support for Kurdish groups in northern Syria that it links to the PKK – designated as a terrorist organisation in the EU, US and Turkey – and is planning to stage a fringe meeting on the issue at the Nato summit.

“This is a matter of vital national interest, and we are prepared to prevent their membership for as long as a year if necessary,” said Akif Çağatay Kılıç, an MP for the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP) and chair of the Turkish parliament’s foreign affairs committee. “Turkey is the second largest army in Nato and has been providing the drones that help Ukraine defend itself. We deserve greater respect.”

He said Turkey respected its own duties and responsibilities to the alliance. “What are [Sweden and Finland] going to do? They have been harbouring terrorist organisations that kill my people, disrespect my borders, pose an existential threat to my country. The only thing we demand is that there are no distinctions. A terrorist organisation is a terrorist organisation.”

He denied the crisis was an attempt to fan nationalist flames before difficult elections, saying the non-Kurdish opposition parties were supportive of the stance of the president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. He also said there was no attempt to barter with the US over arms deals.

During a visit to Sweden on Tuesday, Finland’s prime minister, Sanna Marin, warned: “If we don’t solve these issues before [the] Madrid [summit], there is a risk that the situation will freeze.

“We don’t know for how long but it might freeze for a while.”

Jens Stoltenberg, the Nato secretary general, has praised Swedish efforts to address Turkey’s concerns, but seems to have recognised that plans for a fast-track membership may now be disappearing.

The Swedish prime minister, Magdalena Andersson, is due to attend the summit, which may end up being a show of division as much as it is concerned with long-term strategic thinking and enlargement. Privately, western officials admit that Germany, France and the US are not keen to have Ukraine dominate the summit, although it is hard to imagine Nato support for Kyiv not being the central issue.

On Friday Sweden tried to mollify Turkey by publishing a foreign policy paper that highlighted the need to fight terrorism, and opened a path for Sweden to resume arms export sales to Turkey. Sweden imposed restrictions on arms sales in 2019 after Turkey’s invasion of northern Syria. Britain has already lifted the sales ban.

The policy paper said Sweden would “contribute to all of Nato’s security including that of Turkey”. A tougher anti-terrorism law, due to come into force on 1 July, gives the Swedish intelligence services greater latitude to monitor communications of suspected terrorist sympathisers.

Although Turkish demands can vary, officials have said they want to see specific Kurdish activists deported to Turkey, as well as the sacking of the Swedish defence minister, Peter Hultqvist, over a 2011 meeting with the PKK, which has been designated as a terrorist organisation in Sweden since 1984.

Ankara would like the two countries to sever ties with the US-backed Syrian Kurdish autonomous administration, which Turkey says has a synonymous leadership to the PKK.

Andersson’s room for manoeuvre is limited, in that she is not going to transform Swedish extradition laws simply to satisfy the threats coming from the Turkish president, and last week she had to rely on the support of a Kurdish Swedish MP and former peshmerga fighter, Amineh Kakabaveh, to survive a narrow confidence vote. The MP says she received unspecified guarantees in return for her vote.

Sweden is home to 100,000 Kurdish refugees.

Turkish diplomats resent suggestions that it did not make its objections to Swedish membership earlier or that it is being hypocritical about the Kurdish issue due to its support for extremist groups elsewhere in the Middle East.

Finland has fewer problems with Turkey, but has said it is unlikely to press ahead with a membership request without Sweden.

Finnish media reported that the country received 10 Turkey-related extradition requests between 2019 and 2022. It granted two of those requests and is processing seven.

While Britain has strong diplomatic ties with Turkey, it has also given security assurances to the two Nordic countries during the potentially dangerous grey period between their application to join Nato and the moment when full membership gives them the alliance’s collective defence protection.

In an effort to find a resolution, the UK’s Europe minister, James Cleverly, is in Turkey this week to meet ministers. Angus Lapsley, the director for Euro-Atlantic security at the Foreign Office, said the UK was working night and day to try to resolve the dispute.

Stoltenberg has said the Madrid summit was never a deadline.

#### Turkey is demanding steps by Finland and Sweden before it supports accession

Tosu, 22 – Director of International Programs at the University of Nevada (6/23/2022, Mehmet, 2022"Unity, solidarity against common threats key for NATO, Türkiye tells US," No Publication; <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/unity-solidarity-against-common-threats-key-for-nato-turkiye-tells-us/2621180>, DOA: 6-23-2022) SMTX//BSA

There must be unity, harmony and solidarity among NATO allies against common security and terrorist threats, Türkiye’s Presidential spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin said in a phone call with US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan on Thursday.

Along with bilateral political and economic ties, the officials held discussions on Türkiye’s role in NATO and contributions to the alliance, the upcoming NATO Madrid summit, Sweden and Finland’s NATO bids, grain shipments through the Black Sea and other regional issues, according to a statement from the Turkish presidential spokesperson.

They exchanged views on issues on the agenda for next week’s NATO summit, including its new Strategic Concept, the Ukraine war, the fight against terrorism, the global food crisis and other security issues, the statement said.

Kalin emphasized that NATO allies must have a unified stance against common security and terrorist threats, reiterating that Sweden and Finland must fulfill Türkiye’s demands and expectations in the fight against terrorism.

Since Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO last month, Türkiye, a longstanding member of the alliance, has repeatedly voiced objections over the countries’ tolerance, and even support, for terrorist groups, particularly the PKK terrorist organization.

Kalin stressed that no progress could be made on the matter until Sweden and Finland take concrete steps.

He underlined that it was unacceptable that PKK/PYD/YPG supporters are disseminating propaganda in Stockholm and through the media while Ankara remains engaged in talks with the two Nordic countries.

He also conveyed that Türkiye is continuing negotiations with Ukraine and Russia on creating a safe corridor for grain shipments through the Black Sea.

Achieving results from this negotiation process, which includes the UN, is of strategic importance for global food security, he added.

#### Turkey has several concerns about Sweden and Finland that could derail or at least delay accession

**Ünlühisarcıklı, 22 -- manager of the Resource Development Department of the Educational Volunteers Foundation of Turkey** [5-19-2022, Özgür, “Erdoğan Will Not Walk Away Empty-Handed,” <https://www.gmfus.org/news/finland-and-sweden-apply-join-nato-whats-next>, accessed on 6-18-2022, LKK]

Sweden and Finland’s decision to apply for NATO membership is welcome with enthusiasm across the Atlantic, but Turkey may spoil the party.

In an unexpected move, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has announced that he does not favor the two countries’ membership to NATO on the grounds that they are havens for terrorist organizations targeting Turkey, specifically the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its offshoots. Both Sweden and Finland reject this claim but remain open to discussions with Turkey on the subject.

It would be a mistake to dismiss Erdoğan’s stance as being motivated by domestic political considerations alone or to expect him to walk back empty-handed. Turkey has real concerns and will likely delay the upcoming NATO enlargement unless those concerns are addressed by Sweden and Finland.

Erdoğan is playing a two-level game here. At the international level, he aims to further weaken the PKK. In Turkey’s view, separatist terrorism is the single most important security threat and whether others agree is not relevant for its calculus. Degrading the PKK has been, and remains, a priority for every government in Turkey since the 1980s.

At the domestic level, he aims to portray himself as a strong leader who can protect Turkey’s interests internationally in a way that his predecessors could not. According to the [Turkish Perceptions of the European Union 2021 Survey](https://www.gmfus.org/news/turkish-perceptions-european-union) conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, 67.9 percent of Turkish respondents believe that the European countries want to divide and disintegrate Turkey, just like they did to the Ottoman Empire in the past. Moreover, 70.1 percent believe that the European countries have helped strengthen separationist organizations such as the PKK in Turkey. As such, Erdoğan’s criticism toward Sweden and Finland will easily resonate with the Turkish people.

It would also be a mistake for Ankara to underestimate the magnitude of the decision to delay a historical NATO enlargement and the negative reaction it would face from each and every NATO ally at a time when Turkey is trying to bridge the gap between itself and its Western allies.

Turkish, Swedish, and Finnish diplomats, with support from other allies, can and should find common ground to address the concerns regarding the stance of Sweden and Finland toward the PKK and ensure that NATO enlargement can proceed without delay. The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO is so important, for Turkey as well, that this problem will likely be resolved through dialogue and empathy. But it will not go away on its own.

#### Turkey blocks Finland and Sweden from joining NATO

Coşkun, 22 – senior fellow at CEIP and former director general for int-security affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (June 24, 22; Alper Coşkun; “Turkey and NATO are stronger with each other. They must de-thorne their relationship”; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkey-and-nato-are-stronger-with-each-other-they-must-de-thorn-their-relationship/AI)

As NATO prepares for its summit in Madrid next week, Turkey is in the headlines for holding up Finland and Sweden’s bids to join the Alliance—irking not only the two candidate countries, but also their would-be NATO allies.

Ankara wants Helsinki and Stockholm to stop harboring and supporting individuals affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it considers to be a terrorist organization (and is recognized as such by both the United States and the European Union). It also demands an end to the arms embargoes imposed by these countries after Turkey’s military operation in northern Syria in 2019. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has made it clear that nothing short of concrete steps will be enough to reverse Turkey’s stance.

Turkey’s concerns are serious and, as stated by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, they are “legitimate.” Yet Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the belated manner in which Ankara has publicly raised its concerns have muddled that important reality, tainting Turkey and its role in the Alliance.

#### Turkey will still block Sweden and Finland --- disagreement over PKK issue

Alaaldin, 22 – Nonresident Fellow for Foreign Policy at the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings (Ranj, 2022"Turkey’s threat to derail Swedish and Finnish NATO accession reraises the Kurdish question," Brookings; https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/03/turkeys-threat-to-derail-swedish-and-finnish-nato-accession-reraises-the-kurdish-question/;DOA: 6-21-2022) SMTX//BSA

Turkey’s opposition to Sweden and Finland joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the wake of Russia’s war on Ukraine has elevated the Kurdish question on the international stage. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is attempting to capitalize on the urgency of fortifying Western deterrence by increasing the pressure on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The insurgent group has fought the Turkish state for five decades to secure greater rights for Turkey’s Kurds but enjoyed a rapid ascension with the onset of the Syrian civil war and Washington’s 2014 decision to partner with its sister organization to defeat the Islamic State group (IS).

The PKK has constituted a major component of Turkey’s relationship with Europe and the United States for decades, and Erdoğan has initiated several military campaigns into Syria’s northeast to suppress the autonomous enclave the PKK’s sister organization, the Peoples’ Protection Units (YPG), formed in the midst of the civil war. While Turkey may be using the Nordic NATO accession talks to receive Western backing for another campaign, it has a long record of carrying out cross-border incursions against the PKK and Erdoğan may also be trying to secure other concessions, including the lifting of embargoes on Turkey’s defense industry.

But Ankara’s opposition to Swedish and Finnish accession, based on their refusal to extradite PKK members, as well as followers of the Islamic cleric Fethullah Gülen (whom Ankara accuses of instigating a 2016 coup attempt), highlights that the Kurdish question cannot be decoupled from Western security interests. The tectonic shifts that have taken place in the global security order since Russia invaded Ukraine means that the second-order effects of the war against IS and the proximity of the Kurdish question to U.S. and European security interests requires a reprioritization of the issue in the West.

Turkey’s conflict with the PKK has long complicated Turkey’s relations with the U.S. and its European allies. Relations have been in flux and either enhanced or upended by shifting fault lines in the Middle East since the 2011 Arab uprisings and the emergence of IS. Although the 2013 peace process between the Turkish state and the PKK raised hopes of a lasting settlement, the fragile truce was upended in 2015 by the YPG’s ascension in Syria, its refusal to prioritize the fall of the Assad regime, and deep-seated animosities. The result was a renewal of a domestic conflict that has taken on multiple transnational dimensions and produced untold humanitarian crises.

Ankara has for decades questioned Europe’s commitment to addressing its security concerns. In the 1990s, Greece and Italy provided refuge to the PKK’s imprisoned founder and leader, Abdullah Öcalan, and the PKK established an expansive infrastructure, including in Sweden, that allows it to mobilize supporters and resources in Europe and in Turkey. European leaders had hoped to leverage Turkey’s EU accession process to improve Turkey’s human rights records but talks stagnated more than a decade ago and both sides have effectively given up on it.

Similarly, in addition to supporting the YPG, the U.S. has provoked Erdoğan’s ire by refusing to extradite the Pennsylvania-based Gülen, while Washington also imposed tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminium after an agreement to release pastor Andrew Brunson fell through in 2018. Ankara did U.S.-Turkey relations no favours by purchasing Russian air defense systems, after which Washington imposed sanctions on Turkey.

Turkey’s relations with the West will continue to be crisis-driven amid a range of ongoing tensions, including over the conflict in Libya, the eastern Mediterranean crisis, tensions with the EU over the future of 3 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, and NATO expansion in response to Russia’s aggression. Putting Turkish responsibility for the current state of affairs to one side, the trans-Atlantic alliance is guilty of failing to establish forward-looking approaches to tumult in Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighborhood, opting instead for incoherent and reactive engagement that has put issues like the PKK conflict and broader Kurdish political questions on the back burner.

The failure to mitigate the second-order effects of policies designed to address security threats like IS has allowed Ankara to exploit the West’s failure to balance the imperative of securing the defeat of the jihadis with the need to manage the security interests of regional actors like Turkey. This has had serious strategic implications, as evidenced by the current dispute over NATO membership and the pressure NATO has faced as a result of the ebb in relations and disputes over the YPG’s dominance in Syria.

### U.S.-Turkey Relations Low

#### U.S.-Turkey relations are low now --- erodes consensus building

#### Coşkun, 22 – senior fellow at CEIP and former director general for int-security affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (June 24, 22; Alper Coşkun; “Turkey and NATO are stronger with each other. They must de-thorne their relationship”; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkey-and-nato-are-stronger-with-each-other-they-must-de-thorn-their-relationship/, AI)

Restoring the balance

But serious thorns remain in Turkey’s relations with certain allies, and the estrangement risks undermining NATO’s resilience at a critical juncture.

For one, Turkey is deeply irritated that the United States and others are partnering with the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Syrian branch of the PKK, in the fight against the Islamic State. It is also frustrated at the imposition of arms embargoes—or covert restrictions on arms sales—by its allies over issues like Ankara’s purchase of Russian-made S-400 air-defense systems, its Syria policy, and its support for Azerbaijan in the 2020 war against Armenia. These differences have led to a mutual erosion of trust between Turkey and its allies, sometimes making consensus-building on critical matters difficult.

The Syria issue has, over time, become the most harmful one, pushing Turkey to the extreme on a matter it considers to be of existential nature: fighting terrorism. The first public manifestation of this deepening discord came before NATO leaders met in London in 2019—where Turkey held out until the last minute before begrudgingly endorsing Poland’s and the Baltic states’ defense plans. Ankara was reacting to a hold that had previously been placed on its own defense plans at the behest of the United States, rooted in disagreement about how to refer to the YPG.

### Congress Will Delay NATO Expansion

#### Senate will delay approval for expansion --- could take several months

Auerswald 22 – Professor of Security Studies at the U.S. National War College [David Auerswald, May 17, 2022, “How the US Senate could slow down Sweden and Finland’s NATO future” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-the-us-senate-could-slow-down-sweden-and-finlands-nato-future/ Acc 6/21/22 ER]

If history is any guide, the Senate will overwhelmingly support adding Finland and Sweden to NATO (certainly by more than the two-thirds required by the Constitution). That was the case in 1998, when senators supported membership for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland by an 80-19 vote; in 2003, when senators unanimously welcomed Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia by a 96-0 vote; in 2008, when senators admitted Albania and Croatia by voice vote; and in 2017 and 2019, when it approved Montenegro and Northern Macedonia, respectively, to join the Alliance with only two dissenting votes each time.

The more interesting question is how long it will take the Senate to provide its advice and consent—and here the record does not bode well. The amended treaty is likely to be signed in the next few weeks, perhaps even before the NATO Summit at the end of June. That means the Senate, which is typically in recess during August, would need to hold hearings and vote in June and July, September and October, or wait until a lame duck session after the midterm elections. The fastest enlargement process, in 2003, took a month and a half from the NATO signing ceremony to final Senate passage. Other rounds took much longer: The 1998 round took more than four months, while the 2017 and 2019 enlargements took more than ten and eight months, respectively. The war in Ukraine could certainly speed up the process, but do not be surprised if the Senate process drags into the fall.

Another question is whether senators will condition their votes on changes in administration policy. In 1997, for example, Republican Sen. Jesse Helms withheld support for the Chemical Weapons Convention until the Clinton administration agreed to abolish the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the US Information Agency.

Senators can also use more subtle means to change policy. In providing treaty advice and consent, senators pass what is called a ratification document that affirms that Washington will abide by the treaty’s terms. Senators can add all sorts of reservations, understandings, and conditions to that document. For example, senators have specified that arms-control treaties do not limit US missile-defense capabilities.

Nothing in the Constitution or US law requires that these reservations, understandings, or conditions be limited to the treaty itself. That means senators can add clauses requiring executive-branch reports to Congress on unrelated foreign-policy issues, prohibitions on certain kinds of executive-branch behavior, or administration acceptance of a senator’s foreign-policy initiative. For instance, senators included provisions on Nazi war crimes and unrelated prisoner-of-war issues in the 1998 NATO enlargement document. And a document addressing the 1988 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty specified the allowable parameters of future conventional arms control and human-rights agreements with the Soviet Union.

The record demonstrates that the chamber is more likely to add (perhaps unrelated) conditions to treaties dealing with important security issues such as NATO membership when the United States lacks a foreign-policy consensus, or when it is facing few international threats. Given the war in Ukraine, expanding NATO would seem to qualify as an important issue and one on which there is near-consensus on the Russian threat and NATO’s role in deterring it. This suggests that we will see conditions added to the NATO enlargement ratification document, but not the dozens that have been added to other security treaties. The fewer the conditions, the faster will be the Senate debate.

Still, ultra-partisan senators tend to insert non-germane conditions and significant reporting requirements on any number of issues into treaty ratification documents—something we can expect from today’s polarized Senate. That slows the process.

The Senate debate over NATO’s enlargement is likely to yield a positive result. But the question is how long that debate will take and what conditions senators may levy on the administration in exchange for their votes.

### AT: Turkey Autonomous Weapons Link

#### Turkey supports human control

Wareham, 20 --- advocacy director in the arms division at Human Rights Watch (August 10, 2020, Mary, “Stopping Killer Robots; Country Positions on Banning Fully Autonomous Weapons and Retaining Human Control,” <https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/10/stopping-killer-robots/country-positions-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons-and>, JMP)

Turkey

In November 2013, Turkey supported a proposal to begin multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems.[254] In April 2016, Turkey said that “such weapon systems do not exist and we are working on an issue which is still hypothetical,” therefore, “we hesitate on the accuracy of a general prohibition preemptively.”[255] It also affirmed the “need for human control and accountability” of weapons systems.[256] Turkey is developing, producing, and using various weapons systems with autonomous functions. Turkey participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019.

#### Turkey denied that drones operated autonomously to strike targets

Gurcan, 21 --- served in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Iraq as a Turkish military adviser from 2002 to 2008 (June 8, 2021, Metin Gurcan, “Turkish drone sets off international buzz over 'killer robots'; The appearance of Turkish artificial intelligence-controlled drones in Libyan skies has rekindled questions on how lethal autonomous weapons will affect regional geopolitics and whether they should be banned,” <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/06/turkish-drone-sets-international-buzz-over-killer-robots>, JMP)

Turkish military sources familiar with the matter confirmed that Kargu-2s had been used in Libya on multiple occasions, but denied that the drones — which have both autonomous and manual operation modes — were allowed to use artificial intelligence to select and hit targets. The drones operated autonomously only to reach target areas, after which operators on the ground made the decisions to strike, the sources told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity.

### NATO Expansion => Nuclear War with Russia

#### NATO expansion risks Russian nuclear aggression --- wants to secure borderwith Finland

Caldwell and Vought, 22 – President of the Center for Renewing America and VP of Foreign Policy at Stand Together [Dan and Russ; 6/13/22; Fox News; “Finland and Sweden joining NATO won’t make U.S. safer”; <https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/finland-sweden-joining-nato-us-safer>; accessed 6/18/22; DWC]

Additionally, neither country currently meets the 2 percent of GDP defense spending goal that was agreed to by NATO members. Just as in other parts of Europe, a security guarantee provided by the United States could encourage free-riding and disincentivize increased investment in defense capabilities in favor of more spending on politically popular social programs.

But most dangerously, adding Finland and Sweden to NATO will increase the risk of a nuclear confrontation with Russia. As a result of its failures in Ukraine, the threat posed by Russia’s conventional forces has been reduced. But Russia still possesses a large nuclear arsenal that, according to the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, they will likely rely on more to secure their borders — including the nearly 850-mile one they share with Finland. NATO membership for Finland and Sweden includes extending the umbrella of America’s nuclear deterrent to both nations, thus elevating the risk that any border dispute could escalate into a nuclear exchange.

Instead of enabling NATO accession for Finland and Sweden, the United States should take actions to encourage the strengthening and development of non-NATO security architectures in Europe like the Nordic Defence Cooperation, which Finland and Sweden are already a part of. The failures of Russia’s military in Ukraine have demonstrated that collectively Europe is more than capable of securing itself without significant U.S. support, as long they properly prioritize defense investments.

#### Sweden and Finland joining NATO risks nuclear conflict with Russia AND forces resource tradeoffs

Caldwell and Vought, 22 – President of the Center for Renewing America and VP of Foreign Policy at Stand Together [Dan and Russ; 6/13/22; Fox News; “Finland and Sweden joining NATO won’t make U.S. safer”; <https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/finland-sweden-joining-nato-us-safer>; accessed 6/18/22; DWC]

It is not in the national interest of the United States, through NATO, to commit to defend two wealthy European welfare states whose neutrality has kept them safe and prosperous for more than 70 years. While some insist Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changes everything, the fact remains that new security guarantees will force trade-offs, consume more resources, and increase the likelihood of a confrontation with a nuclear-armed adversary.

Despite rhetoric from NATO evangelists that can often give the contrary impression, adding Finland and Sweden to NATO will lead to increased costs for the U.S.

Admitting both nations to NATO could generate up-front expenses of over $8 billion along with $1.5 billion in additional annual costs. And while U.S. military leaders are currently claiming that their membership in NATO won’t lead to a permanent stationing of troops in either nation, they do admit that more U.S. troops will likely rotate to both Finland and Sweden on a more frequent basis. This will place further strain on a U.S. military that is already struggling to sustain deployments in support of dozens of ongoing operations including active combat missions in Iraq, Syria, and Somalia.

One frequently cited justification for admitting Finland and Sweden to NATO is that they have capable militaries that would enhance NATO. However, the reality is that both countries have relatively small professional militaries of around 20,000 troops each that rely on large reserve forces in a time of war and which lack long-range force projection capabilities. Sweden is already requesting a larger U.S. naval presence in the Baltic Sea, calling into question the ability of their military to secure their own backyard.

Additionally, neither country currently meets the 2 percent of GDP defense spending goal that was agreed to by NATO members. Just as in other parts of Europe, a security guarantee provided by the United States could encourage free-riding and disincentivize increased investment in defense capabilities in favor of more spending on politically popular social programs.

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At a time of record inflation and a $30.5 trillion national debt, it is hard to justify spending more American tax dollars and committing more American troops to defend two wealthy European social democracies.

This is particularly true when neither state enhances U.S. security and both have benefited from neutrality for decades. The lack of robust debate around this important topic and the smearing of those who dare to question the benefits of NATO expansion only raises the risk that the United States will become overextended, or worse, potentially sleep-walk into a war with a nuclear-armed Russia.

After decades of foreign policy failures that have cost the United States dearly, America’s elected officials owe the American people better than more costly security commitments disconnected from our safety and economic prosperity.

#### Risks war with Russia – Finland is highly exposed to military threats

Ashford, 22 – senior fellow in the New American Engagement Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security [5-30-2022, washington post, "NATO Should Think Twice Before Accepting Finland and Sweden," https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/nato-should-think-twice-before-accepting-finland-and-sweden/2022/05/30/b412ee2a-dff7-11ec-ae64-6b23e5155b62\_story.html accessed on 6-18-2022, LKK]

Consider also the question of the defensibility of new NATO territory. Admitting Sweden could be strategically beneficial, allowing NATO forces to better control the Baltic Sea and to use Gotland Island, at an important chokepoint off the Baltic States, as a staging ground for any future conflict.

Finnish territory, in contrast, is a strategic nightmare. It would dramatically increase the alliance’s exposure to any future attacks by Moscow: the country shares an 800-mile border with Russia that, as a recent study from the Center for Strategic and International Studies put it, is “highly exposed to Russian military threats.”

There are grab bag of other reasons for caution, including the usual concerns about expanding the alliance to an ever-more unwieldy set of member states. It doesn’t take a genius to predict that 32 nations will be even harder to manage than 30. Before its Ukraine moment, NATO was struggling to maintain the peace between Greece and Turkey, few nations were meeting the 2% spending goal, and President Emmanuel Macron of France had drawn headlines for suggesting the alliance was experiencing “brain death.”

Even in the face of Russia’s aggression, support for adding the two members isn’t unanimous. Turkey’s vehement opposition to Finland and Sweden may be an attempt to wring political concessions from the alliance, but also owes a lot to these countries’ support for Kurdish causes.

Alliance leaders should also consider the risk of Russian overreaction. Moscow has started three wars over potential NATO expansion — invading Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 before the current war. While Moscow is clearly not able to stage another major military campaign right now, one cannot rule out President Vladimir Putin doing something irrational in response to a NATO expansion that takes the alliance within 200 miles of his birthplace of St. Petersburg.

At the same time, it’s not clear that Finland and Sweden are at increased risk unless they are allowed NATO membership. They have long relied on their neutral status and domestic defense capacity to prevent crises. Refusing to admit them to NATO is not hanging them out to dry, but simply retaining a workable status quo.

The symbolic value of admitting two new member states as the price for Russia’s brutality in Ukraine may carry the day in Brussels. But before proceeding further with the accession process — which offers leaders and legislatures in each member state a chance to weigh in — policy makers should consider the whole strategic picture, and whether admission strengthens the alliance or not.

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty makes clear that existing members may invite new states to join if they “contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.” By that standard, the strategic case for admitting Sweden and Finland to NATO is not a slam-dunk.

### NATO Expansion Undermines Asian Pivot

#### Expansions will complicate the Asian pivot --- saddles U.S. with more defense obligations

Ashford, 22 – senior fellow in the New American Engagement Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security [5-30-2022, washington post, "NATO Should Think Twice Before Accepting Finland and Sweden," https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/nato-should-think-twice-before-accepting-finland-and-sweden/2022/05/30/b412ee2a-dff7-11ec-ae64-6b23e5155b62\_story.html accessed on 6-18-2022, LKK]

One of the ironies of Russia’s war against Ukraine — ostensibly fought to prevent that nation from joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization — has been its impact on two of Europe’s traditionally neutral states, Finland and Sweden. On May 18, just 84 days after the invasion, Swedish and Finnish ambassadors handed over applications to join NATO in a public ceremony at the alliance’s headquarters in Brussels.

“This is a historic moment which we must seize,” said Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. “You are our closest partners, and your membership in NATO will increase our shared security.” It seems likely that their applications will be swiftly approved, and NATO will soon grow to a 32 member states.

Yet in the rush to give Putin a black eye by embracing Finland and Sweden, US and NATO leaders may be failing to consider the potential costs of inducting two more countries into what, after all, is intended to be a collective defense organization.

There are only two clear-cut benefits to bringing in the two Nordic nations. The first is symbolic: providing a clear demonstration of European and democratic solidarity against Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. The second is technical: Admitting Finland and Sweden would better align the membership of NATO with that of the EU, avoiding the unlikely but problematic scenario in which an EU member state is subject to aggression but is not covered by NATO’s Article 5 mutual-defense pact.

In every other respect, however, the question of Finnish and Swedish membership is more complicated and worrisome. Consider overall European defense capacity.

Yes, Finland and Sweden have highly advanced economies. They could be net contributors to NATO’s technological capabilities through national champions like Ericsson AB and Nokia Oyj. They are also more capable militarily than some other European states — particularly Finland, which has maintained conscription into the post-Cold War period and has a relatively wide range of military competencies, including the continent’s largest artillery force.

Yet from the point of view of existing NATO members — and particularly the US — it’s still not necessarily a net win. Finland and Sweden have long focused their militaries on defending their own territories, raising doubts about their value in contributing to a common defense, which is at the heart of NATO’s charter.

And while both nations have pledged to increase their military spending and ability to bolster Europe’s broader defenses, it is also possible that they would not. Instead, they may free-ride on America’s military strength — and its nuclear umbrella — as so many European states have done for years. According to the International Monetary Fund, neither country comes close to meeting the NATO goal of spending 2% of GDP on defense.

History suggests the most likely outcome is two more states adding to America’s defense burden at a time when Washington should be pivoting to Asia.

### NATO Expansion Undermines European Cooperative Defense

#### European states are relying on US support for defense – expanding the alliance will only make this worse

**Maitra 22 – National Security Fellow, at the Center for the National Interest** [SUMANTRA, MAY 23, 2022, Center for Renewing America, “NATO EXPANSION FOR FINLAND AND SWEDEN: A DANGEROUS AND UNNECESSARY DISTRACTION FROM US INTERESTS” https://americarenewing.com/issues/nato-expansion-for-finland-and-sweden-a-dangerous-and-unnecessary-distraction-from-us-interests/ Acc 6/19/22 ER]

America’s strategic interest in the European balance is not under any significant threat from a potential hegemonic challenge that seeks to dominate the entirety of European landmass under one army and one flag.26 During the early years of the Republic, American grand strategy in Europe was one of cautious detachment and non-interference in the imperial affairs of the European great powers. After the fall of the traditional historic balancer of Europe, the British empire, and facing two world wars and hegemonic threats to security from Imperial, and subsequently Nazi Germany, American strategy evolved to one that mirrored the historic British grand-strategy of “offshore balancing,” that ensured that America would intervene whenever there was a hegemonic threat in the European horizon. To that end, the interests of the United States, much like the British empire before her, is to ensure a militarily disunited Europe, and maintain open trade and sea routes.

The difference in this instance was that the British aspired to attain this objective through a delicate “balance of power” within the continent with minimal interference to tilt the balance as and when required, while cautiously avoiding continuous engagement in the domestic affairs of European countries, or commitments about spreading rights and values. While the American interest in ensuring no hegemonic threat in the European continent remained intact, the American grand-strategy, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, deviated from an earlier realist one. It in turn sought to institutionalise peace across the continent, while ensuring fundamental human rights in every corner – or in the words of John Mearsheimer and Barry Posen, ensure primacy and spread “liberal hegemony.”

Unfortunately, that resulted in the atrophy of Europe’s traditional security providers–the western powers–and at the same time, encouraged free riding on American treasure and muscle. The institutionalisation of peace, first through an expansion of NATO and then through support of the EU, also resulted in buckpassing wherein Western European great powers are perfectly content to wave the EU flag but simultaneously rely on the US tax-funded security subsidies. The Eastern European powers are permanently activist with lofty rhetoric about values and human rights, meanwhile leaving the security burden in large part to be covered by the US. Both Western European states and the Eastern European states act rationally based on their narrow security interests, and that is perfectly understandable. The narrow American interest is the only one ignored in this context.

Several American presidents and policymakers, from Dwight Eisenhower to John Kennedy to Donald Trump, have attempted to grapple with European free-riding and “buckpassing.”27 Various attempts were made either through implicit warnings (such as Bob Gates’ final speech to NATO in 2011) or explicit threats (under the Trump Administration) to encourage or compel Western European powers to shoulder more security burden and provide security umbrella to theatres in Eastern Europe.28

Further enlargement of NATO in the current scenario risks doubling down on American security commitments. That, coupled with unlimited financial aid for Ukraine, or further permanent troop additions in theatres of Eastern Europe, reverses all the recent gains that were made to require Europe to fund more of its own security requirements. In the face of renewed Russian aggression, a one-time US infusion of resources and weaponry to Ukraine may have been understandable, as were enhanced bilateral alignments with Finland and Sweden. However, those efforts should have been accompanied by corresponding requirements that rich European states shoulder the long-term localized security architecture and endure the majority of the future cost. This is especially so given that a localized war in the periphery of their continent is of far more strategic significance to Europeans, than it is to the United States. As the accompanying chart demonstrates, it is not justifiable to American taxpayers that Europe is once again subsidized by the US.

Instead, the Biden administration is absolutely determined to double down on the failures of the post-Cold-war strategy in supporting the addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO. The shift of NATO frontiers further to the east and north, and adding more buffer states, would only disincentivize rich Western European nations from providing security in their own backyard. With the rising threat of a near-peer rival in China, severe economic downturn, and looming strategic trade-offs, committing more to NATO is irresponsible and imprudent.

### NATO Expansion Unnecessary – Sweden & Finland Already Capable

#### Sweden and Finland are already capable of defeating Russia without NATO or other outside support

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Within ten weeks, Finland’s eight decades-long equidistance, and Sweden’s two centuries long neutrality were jettisoned, in favor of unprecedented levels of military bloc formations and foreign military power support pledges, most notably from fellow Scandinavian nations: Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and a post-Brexit Britain.5 Having rejected their historic neutrality, Finland and Sweden have now made formal applications to NATO membership. However, the new desire for NATO membership should not be construed as revealing a lack of current defenses or alertness towards the danger posed by Russia.

The existing force postures of Finland and Sweden are uniquely designed to deter Russia unilaterally. The Finnish force of 280,000 is augmented by around 900,000 reservists who are trained for wartime.6 Finland never abolished conscription, so the Finnish population is functionally ready for wartime service at a moment’s notice. Finnish “Comprehensive Security” stresses training to balance Russian hybrid warfare, with intelligence exchange, interoperability, and training with Western forces.7 Finnish strategy of insurgency as a deterrence tactic to blunt massive occupation forces is designed with Russia in mind. Finnish defence spending is roughly 2% of GDP and certain to increase.8 Finland is thus well positioned to blunt and deter any Russian invasion on its own and is almost certain to have major western support in arms and resources in case of a war, even without NATO membership, as Ukraine has enjoyed.

Sweden saw major cuts in defense spending and manpower in the immediate post-Cold War era similar to other major powers, but brought back conscription in 2017, after some deliberation following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.9 Sweden boasted of mass conscription during the Cold War and had one of the largest trained militaries, which were downsized as the Soviet threat receded. Sweden is also fortunate to have the Baltic states and Finland as buffer states from a direct Russian land invasion. In recent days however, Sweden increased its draft by 4,000 soldiers per year and reinstated a garrison on a dormant but strategic island base in Visby, Gotland. Overall, both Sweden and Finland have been and arguably are capable of deterring a Russian push for conquest.10

The Case Against NATO Expansion:

In a recent open survey of Euro-Atlantic foreign policy experts, a question was posed about whether Finnish and Swedish memberships are useful for NATO. The answers ranged from “no doubt,” to “certainly,” and “definitely,” to “straight yes” and “enormously so,” before reaching the broad consensus that the accession of Finland and Sweden would “strengthen the alliance’s defenses and greatly increase security in the Baltic region.” There was not a single voice of dissent.11 While this might be exemplary of a typical selection bias in such quarters, and design flaw in open question surveys, the Atlanticist foreign policy community has been overwhelmingly supportive of adding further commitments and members in the alliance. This is symptomatic of the long generational and ideological shift in foreign policy thinking in Washington, from serious scholarly opposition to NATO’s first round of expansion during the Clinton administration, to an overwhelming support in recent days.12

Support for Finnish and Swedish membership can be categorized into three broad arguments.13 First, that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine unleashed an intense “security dilemma” and the smaller states who now feel threatened should be immediately added as protectorates and the western (primarily American) nuclear umbrella extended. Second, Sweden and Finland are already de facto part of the Western alliance, through either regional cooperative frameworks such as the Nordic Defense Cooperation and Joint Expeditionary Force, or collaborations within the EU framework and partnerships with NATO. Third, Sweden and Finland already have strong militaries and countries with democratic foundations, and both bring unique deterrence capabilities and strengthen NATO’s northern flank which will make NATO stronger. These arguments are contradictory, often paradoxical, and strategically flawed.

The first line of argument – that the Russian threat has morphed to now require NATO protection – is predicated on Sweden and Finland’s threat perceptions. While Russia’s revanchism in Ukraine is clear, the fundamental security dynamic has not changed. At the time of this brief, Russia is suffering from enormous and potentially unbridgeable battlefield setbacks. The Russian dash to Kiev failed, and Moscow is seemingly unable to compensate battlefield attrition, including an overwhelming number of officer class attrition, unthinkable for any other top-tier military and unseen in any other recent conflicts. The Russian battlegroups are not in full operational strength. Russia is unable to fill the gaps created by casualties, troop morale is low, and around a fifth of Russian invasion force hardware have been destroyed. In short, Russia is in no position to continue a “war of conquest,” much less a war of occupation or attrition, without declaring a “total war” that requires vast levels of domestic conscription, which is of course, politically unpopular and potentially volatile for Vladimir Putin. While there have been some indications of a willingness to broaden the Russian military base, it is certainly not in the interests of Western policymakers to incentivize such a development. The much-vaunted Russian military reforms quite clearly did not materialize. The Russian-backed air war over Syria was dependent on Syrian regime troops as cannon fodder, and is materially different and far less costly than a multi-spectrum state-vs-state war of conquest in Ukraine. Russia isn’t capable of the latter.

Despite her historic aspirations, Russia enormously overestimated her own power in Ukraine. Instead, the Russian experience in Ukraine, while a humanitarian catastrophe, has demonstrated long term hardware, personnel, intelligence and training deficiencies, as well as structural issues including endemic corruption, old school planning, authoritarian decision-making echochamber, and low troop morale.14 Russia also lacks the economic base and material power and is increasingly reeling under sanctions.15 Put simply, Russia is not going to be the hegemonic spectre looming over Europe anytime in the near future. What logically entails, is that the Ukraine invasion is not the first domino to fall across Europe, meriting a preoccupation with Russian encroachment, but rather, Russia is a manageable threat that European states can increasingly balance on their own collectively. Europeans are perfectly capable without further investment of American treasure or promise of American blood, and a primacist grand-strategy requiring American forward presence.16 The only reason Europe is taking a backseat is because they are reliant on the unending generosity of Americans.17 In addition, a much-weakened Russia can also be extremely volatile, prone to miscalculation and paranoia, which might be exacerbated by the “chain-ganging” of Western great powers by their activist junior allies–a very common and observable dynamic especially seen under the conditions of multipolarity wherein smaller protectorates and hectoring and sanctimonious allies attempt to drag much larger benefactors to a great power war. It is a trap the US must judiciously avoid at all cost. Otherwise the result could well be greater misunderstanding and an even greater risk of accidental conflict along a much longer border with NATO. This paradoxical dynamic isn’t new in international relations, the First World War being the most ruinous example.18

The only development that might reverse an emerging natural equilibrium, is a Ukrainian counterattack on Crimea or somewhere deep inside Russian territory, or a major expansion of an alliance which justifies Russia’s historic and entrenched paranoia, such as a renewed push for further NATO enlargement. A Ukrainian counterattack might result in Russia pulling the nuclear card. It might also solicit a “rally around the flag” effect for this otherwise unpopular and deteriorating war. Barring those, Russian aspiration to be a major revanchist great power in the European balance is practically over, and Russia’s current near total international isolation in 2022 is comparable to her isolation in 1856 or 1921. Meanwhile Ukraine has managed with conscription and compulsory male draft to gather an overwhelming number of men willing to defend their country, and is well supplied with practically unlimited foreign resources and weaponry, an example to other states in the region.

In that light, the idea that Finland and Sweden, with significant military capabilities of their own, need to be in an alliance for protection against Russian revanchism at a time when Russia’s status as a revanchist great power is itself in question, is fallacious, especially with Russia facing a quagmire in Ukraine. The possibility of a Russian invasion and conquest of Finland or Sweden is nearly non-existent.19

Likewise, it is also paradoxical to argue that Finland and Sweden need protection, while simultaneously contending that they are uniquely powerful militaries with deterrence capabilities needed for strengthening NATO’s northern frontier.20 The capabilities that Sweden and Finland has, including a top-tier airforce, are formidable, but not novel to NATO. Addition of another approximately two hundred jets will not significantly alter the combined air power of NATO, which is already superior to Russia. Sweden and Finland will not bring any new capabilities that would drastically alter the balance of power in the region, and other than intelligence sharing, would not add any material advantage to an already overwhelmingly superior NATO. Given that Swedish and Finnish conscription forces and reservists only come into play during a war, and the chance of a war with Russia is negligible, they are also not adding any significant manpower to NATO. NATO’s “enhanced forward presence” from Poland and the Baltic states, can already cover and protect the allies in the region, as well as project power in the Arctic without the need for any new bases in Sweden or Finland. According to NATO’s website, the force projection includes eight multinational “battlegroups, led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United States respectively, [which] are robust and combat-ready forces,” and a “multinational brigade, under Multinational Division Southeast in Romania” for improved situational awareness and enhanced readiness.21 The Baltics and the Arctic are challenging frontiers to defend, and some of the older arguments against NATO enlargement touched upon it. Russia is considered to have an escalation dominance in the region, due to sheer manpower it can muster in a full spectrum war. However, recent Russian experience in Ukraine, and the negligible chance of a full spectrum war should ease some of the concerns about mindless Russian imperial revanchism. According to a Rand Corp analysis, even though the Baltics are hard to defend in case of an actual war, deterring Russia is relatively easy with a few divisions of forward positioned troops, with the implied threat that any casualty would trigger a NATO – Russia war. Newer bases in Finland and Sweden are unnecessary in that regard for any extended deterrence in the region.22

### NATO Expansion Unnecessary – Russia Weak

#### Russia is so weak that expanding NATO is unnecessary

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“NATO membership would strengthen Finland’s security. As a member of NATO, Finland would strengthen the entire defence alliance,” Finland’s President Sauli Niinisto and Prime Minister Sanna Marin said in a joint statement citing the Russian threat of invasion. “Finland must apply for NATO membership without delay.”1The very same day, The Times of London reported (albeit, per Ukrainian military sources) that the Russians lost an entire battalion with over 50 vehicles, and “as many as 73 T-72 and T-80 tanks, BMP armoured fighting vehicles, armoured tractors, a tugboat and other equipment were destroyed,” and that around 1,000 to 1,500 soldiers were killed, while crossing a tactical bridge in Eastern Ukraine, arguably near Russian strongholds.2

Threat is a combination of intention, power, proximity and capability. For that reason, the lackluster performance of Russia in Ukraine, and corresponding heightened threat perception in Europe, is baffling to realists. After all, what is the hegemonic threat potential of a great power across a continent that cannot provide air cover to its massacred battalions over a pontoon bridge, much less total air supremacy over a theatre of war? It is a pertinent line of inquiry. Wounded by her own folly, Russia remains without any demonstrable hegemonic capabilities to conquer Ukraine and molest parts of Eastern Europe or the wider continent.3 Without the threat of Russia as a hegemon, the argument in favour of the US incurring further security commitments in Europe by expanding the NATO alliance to Finland and Sweden is weak.

### U.S. Won’t Send Troops to Finland

#### Expansion will require more forces in Finland that the U.S. won’t send

Poast 22 – associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago [Paul Poast, June 7, 2022, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace “What NATO Needs to Do Before Finland and Sweden Join” <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/06/07/what-nato-needs-to-do-before-finland-and-sweden-join-pub-87262>, Acc 6/18/22 ER]

One step for NATO to take is obvious: deploy forces, immediately. Unlike during past NATO membership expansions, time is not on the alliance’s side here. If it’s too late for pre-planning, then NATO must quickly move to reposition troops into the alliance’s new northeastern flank. If the NATO allies are not willing to commit new troops, this could be achieved by repositioning existing forces. Alternatively, perhaps this is the time for the EU itself, given that Finland and Sweden are both members, to fully commit to being a security provider. The EU could fill the gap in force deployments by encouraging its members to move forces to the Finnish-Russian border, potentially leveraging NATO’s command and control capabilities. Given that the contributions to the Enhanced Forward Presence are shared in a fairly equitable fashion among various NATO members, perhaps this approach can be duplicated in Finland.

However, under the current structure of NATO, the United States is the ultimate backstop for such deployments, and it will ultimately fall on Washington to fill in any gaps in forces for Finland. This is problematic. Though U.S. President Joe Biden and his administration strongly support Finland’s and Sweden’s bids to join NATO, it is unclear that the Biden team, or any future U.S. administration, is willing to base sizeable deployments of U.S. forces on Finnish territory.

To further complicate matters, forward deploying troops on Finnish territory would not be a short-term commitment. Even if the war in Ukraine grinds to a halt, Russia will probably retain or rebuild its ability to carry out quick incursions against its neighbors, which would then include a Finland within NATO. Defending Finland will require a long-term and concrete plan involving the deployment of substantial forces. Such a commitment would not come without costs, both in terms of budget expenses and the potential diversion of troops from other theaters.

Additionally, questions should be asked about how Finland and Sweden will contribute to the defense of NATO territory beyond their own borders. Their presence alters NATO’s map. Whether that alteration is a net positive or negative for the alliance depends on exactly how Sweden’s and Finland’s forces are used. While they have a track record of working alongside NATO members in operations outside NATO territory, will they, for example, assist with the Enhanced Forward Presence? How exactly will they balance Russian operations in the Arctic? These questions must be faced in the rush to add Finland and Sweden to NATO.

### AT: NATO Expansion Reduces U.S. Defense Obligations

#### Adding Sweden and Finland won’t reduce U.S. defense commitments – those exist regardless

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For any other military or intelligence needs, bilateral or EU frameworks are more than sufficient.23 Sweden and Finland’s telecom companies such as Nokia and Ericsson already can get privileged treatment and American defense contracts, and provide a bulwark against Chinese dominance in the domain; a formal alliance isn’t necessary or needed for that. The argument that adding more countries in the alliance will free up American troops is also flawed, as historically that has only led to further Eastern European reliance and demands as well as West European free-riding on the American military. It is simply ahistorical to contemplate that this particular dynamic would change with Finland and Sweden within NATO. Consider that Sweden is not even in NATO yet, and is already calling for more US naval presence in the Baltic sea.24 In fact, Russian force posture towards Finland and Sweden might change once they join NATO, with more potential Russian bases in the Arctic, adding to further increased demands of American military presence.25 The cost-benefit analysis suggests that the only material difference for NATO will be the cost of an additional nearly thousand-mile frontier, and further chances of miscalculation and feeding of Russian paranoia about encirclement, which the Russian ruling elite will use to further justify their worldview.